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NOTES
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR JOB REASSIGNMENT AND
THE TREATMENT OF HYPERSUSCEPTIBLE
EMPLOYEES
INTRODUCTION
July 26, 1990, signaled the beginning of a new era for indi-
viduals with disabilities: on that day the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter ADA) was signed into law.1 The
ADA extends the protections of Titles H and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 to individuals with disabilities, thereby
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of physical or mental dis-
ability by private and public employers, state and local govern-
ments and services, providers of transportation services, provid-
ers of public accommodations and services, and common carriers
of telecommunication services.3 This comprehensive piece of leg-
islation will complete the process, begun by the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,4 of incorporating individuals with
disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of Ameri-
can life.
In addition to extending the scope of existing civil rights
laws, the ADA will clarify some of the ambiguities found in the
language and provisions of sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act.5 One of its most troublesome provisions had
' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 327 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 and 47 U.S.C.
§§ 225, 611).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6, 2000e to e-17 (1988).
3
.ADA §§ 102, 202, 222-228, 242, 302-304, 401 & 402.
' Pub. L. No. 93-112, §§ 500-504, 87 Stat. 390, 390-94 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 790-794(c) (1988)) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act].
29 U.S.C. §§ 791 & 794. Sections 501 and 504 prohibit discrimination against indi-
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prompted the question of whether job reassignment was a man-
dated form of reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilita-
tion Act.' Reassignment involves the transfer of an employee
with a disability from a position the employee is no longer able
to perform to a job that the individual can perform. Courts and
administrative agencies currently continue to disagree about the
extent of an employer's duty to reassign an employee with a dis-
ability, causing cases to be resolved differently depending on
whether the parties have pursued administrative or legal
remedies.
This Note will argue that by explicitly identifying job reas-
signment as one form of reasonable accommodation required by
the ADA, Congress has mandated that all employers must reas-
sign an employee with a disability to a vacant position if an ac-
commodation that would enable the employee to remain in her
original position cannot be made and the reassignment will not
pose an undue hardship to the employer.' In addition, it will ar-
gue that both the case law surrounding the Civil Rights Act and
Congress's stated legislative intent in passing the ADA require
that employers and courts not deem reassignment unreasonable
and thus unnecessary because of the existence of collective bar-
gaining agreements that attach a seniority requirement to the
position that is currently available.
This Note will also examine an area of law included in the
ADA that was not previously covered by the Rehabilitation Act:
the prohibition of preemployment medical examinations and
viduals with disabilities by the federal government and federal government agencies (§
501, 29 U.S.C. § 791) and by programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance
(§ 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794).
While codification of the Rehabilitation Act changed the section numbers from
those used in the original bill, the section numbers used in the original version, e.g., §§
501-504, are still used by individuals practicing in the area of disability law to refer to
specific provisions of the Act.
8 Job reassignment would generally be required if an employee either became dis-
abled while employed, or if an employee's existing disability prevented her from continu-
ing to perform the duties of her job, and no other accommodations could be made that
would enable her to continue in her current job. At this stage, an employer would have to
look for vacant positions at the employee's current job level that the employee would be
qualified for and could now perform. ADA § 101(9)(B).
' See Kathryn W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation
Act: Does Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67
Tx. L. REV. 781 (1989). See also notes 57-86 and accompanying text infra.
8 ADA §§ 101(9) & (10).
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questionnaires that inquire about disabilities. It will explore the
contexts in which these questionnaires usually occur, the limited
manner in which such inquiries can be made pursuant to the
ADA, and the actions an employer may take based upon the re-
sults of permissible inquiries. Finally, this Note will argue that
the ADA's prohibition of discrimination extends to genetic test-
ing in the workplace and to individuals who do not currently
have disabilities but who are identified by such tests as having a
high risk of becoming injured in the future. The ADA will there-
fore not only clarify and extend the protections of earlier laws,
but will also extend the protection of federal laws to individuals
not commonly perceived as having disabilities.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Previous Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination on
the Basis of Disability
Congress took its first steps toward prohibiting discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities in 1973 with the passage of
the Rehabilitation Act.9 This Act prohibited discrimination by
the federal government, federally funded agencies, federal con-
tractors, and any recipients of federal money. The last of these
groups-recipients of federal funding-was covered under sec-
tion 50410 and has received the most attention in the courts.
Although the Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1973, the
bill failed to explicitly authorize regulatory agencies to adopt
and enforce implementing regulations,11 and agencies did not be-
' Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in employment
and in the provision of public accommodations and services on the basis of race, color,
national origin and sex, it did not prohibit such discrimination based on an individual's
disability.
10 Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Section 504 reads, in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in Section 706(7), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
The other sections of the Rehabilitation Act governing employment are: § 501 (29 U.S.C.
§ 791), covering discrimination by the federal government and federal government agen-
cies; § 502 (29 U.S.C. § 792), covering the removal of architectural barriers in federal
buildings; and § 503 (29 U.S.C. § 793), covering recipients of federal contracts.
" See Judith W. Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring
Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 69 CoRNELL L. Rav. 401, 411-12 (1984).
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gin adopting regulations until after the President issued an exec-
utive order in 1980 directing executive agencies to draft regula-
tions to enforce the provisions of the Act. 2 The first regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act were not codi-
fied in the Code of Federal Regulations until 1985, over ten
years after its enactment. 13 In addition to these problems, appli-
cations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act were severely
limited in 1984 after the United States Supreme Court decided
Grove City College v. Bell. 4 The Court held that while Grove
City College was a recipient of federal funds under the anti-dis-
crimination mandate of Title IX, the phrase "program or activ-
ity" used in the statute referred to the specific program or activ-
ity of the college that had received the funds.15 Thus, because
the college had only received federal funds by accepting federal
student loans for tuition, only the college's financial aid depart-
ment was covered under Title IX and similar laws; the college as
a whole was not.'6 As a result, the only discrimination 'proscribed
by Title IX was discrimination within the financial aid depart-
ment.' 7 Although section 504 was not at issue in this case, be-
cause section 504 incorporated the same "program or activity"
language as Title IX, its coverage was also limited by Grove City
to those specific programs or activities that directly received fed-
eral funds.'8
'2 See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980).
'3 See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. §§ 142.1-.42 (1985) (Dep't of State); 43 C.F.R. §§ 17.1-.280
(1985) (Dep't of the Interior); 45 C.F.R. §§ 605.0-.61 (1985) (Nat'l Science Found.); 32
C.F.R. §§ 56.1-.10 (1985) (Office of Sec'y of Defense); 29 C.F.R. §§ 32.1-.51 (1985) (Office
of Sec'y of Labor); 38 C.F.R. §§ 18.1-.461 (1985) (Veterans Admin.); 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.1.
.129 (1985) (Office of Sec'y of Transp.).
14 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In Grove City a municipal college challenged the Department
of Health Education and Welfare's (HEW's) interpretation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. Title IX prohibits educational institutions that are recipients of
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of sex in any of its programs. After HEW
threatened to cut off the college's funding because of its refusal to provide an Assurance
of Compliance with Title IX's provisions, the college filed suit claiming that because it
had only received federal funding through students' Basic Educational Opportunity
Grants (BEOGs), Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination did not apply. Id. at
563. Because the college had received no grants directly from the government-they had
accepted tuition money that the students had received as loans from the federal govern-
ment-the college argued that it had received no federal funds. Id. The Court disagreed.
15 Id. at 573-74.
16 Id.
17 Id.
" See generally Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Assocs., 793 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1986) (use
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For the next four years, it was nearly impossible to prove
discrimination under section 504.19 Finally, in 1988, Congress en-
acted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 [hereinafter
CRRA]. 20 The CRRA defined the phrase "program or activity"
as meaning "all the operations of [any entity] any part of which
is extended Federal financial assistance." 211 Thus, Section 504
once again prohibited discrimination by any entity receiving any
federal money, as was originally intended.22
B. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
1. History
Although the CRRA in combination with the Rehabilitation
Act prohibited discrimination on the basis of disability by all
federally funded private or public entities, it could not prevent
the daily discrimination by private parties not receiving federal
funding that individuals with disabilities face.23 Every day, indi-
viduals with disabilities are denied jobs, prevented from eating
in restaurants, forced to sit in the back of theaters, unable to use
public transportation, and are even prevented from visiting pub-
lic ZOOS. 24
of federal grant money to repay part of loan not sufficient for federal financial assis-
tance); Eivins v. Adventist Health Sys./Eastern & Middle Am., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 340 (D.
Kan. 1987) (hospital holding company not recipient of federal financial asistance
through hospital's receipt of Medicaid); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 628
F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (federally subsidized training program not sufficient to
make entire organization recipient of federal financial assistance).
The Court later clarified and slightly limited the Grove City decision in Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984). The Court stated that Grove City only
applied to students and educational institutions and that it should not be analogized to
apply to nonearmarked direct grants. Id. at 636. The Darrone Court held that a discrimi-
nation suit brought by an employee may be maintained even if the employer received no
federal aid targeted at promoting employment as long as the program the employee
worked in was a recipient of federal financial assistance. Id. at 636-37.
"9 See generally Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter Hearings].
20 Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1687,
1688, 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6107, 2000d-4a) (Supp. 1990)).
21 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
22 See Hearings, supra note 19, at 79-80.
2 See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989) (hereinafter SeNATE R-PoRT].
24 Id. at 7. In addition to listing other examples of blatant discrimination, the SEN-
ATE REPORT included a story from the Washington Post about "a New Jersey zoo keeper
who refused to admit children with Downs Syndrome because he feared they would up-
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In October 1987 members and representatives of the disabil-
ity community began working with Congress to develop a bill
that would prohibit these types of discrimination and enable in-
dividuals with disabilities to enjoy the rights that other Ameri-
cans enjoy.25 The Americans with Disabilities Act was passed by
both houses and was signed into law on July 26, 1990. The dif-
ferent sections of the ADA become effective on various dates be-
tween January 26, 1992, and July 26, 1994.26
2. Provisions
The ADA addresses five areas in which individuals with dis-
abilities commonly face discrimination: employment, services
provided by public entities, public and private transportation,
public accommodations and services provided by private enti-
ties, and telecommunications. For the purposes of the entire
law, an individual with a disability is defined as a person who:
(A) [has] a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) [has] a record of such an impairment; or
(C) [is] [] regarded as having such an impairment.28
set the chimpanzees." Id.
2I Address by Chai R. Feldblum, Program by the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York on Employment of People with Disabilities Today in New York, and To.
morrow Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Oct. 1, 1990).
Drafters familiar with the delay in promulgating § 504 regulations incorporated
much of the language of those regulations into the text of the ADA itself; this would
prevent a delay in issuing regulations to carry out the ADA, enable courts to use § 504
case law to resolve suits arising under it, and also prevent a lack of uniformity in the
regulations various agencies must promulgate to comply with the ADA.
" See text accompanying notes 27-56 infra.
27 §§ 102, 202, 222-228, 242, 302-304, 401 & 402.
28 § 3(2). Excluded from this definition are certain conditions, including homosexu-
ality and bisexuality, transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeur-
ism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, other sexual be-
havior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive
substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs. § 511. In addition, the
term "qualified individual with a disability" used in Title I of the ADA (employment)
excludes current users of illegal drugs. § 104(a), (b)(1)-(3).
Nonetheless, the ADA is quite inclusive. It prohibits discrimination against a person
who has a known relationship or association with a person who has a known disability. §
102(b)(4). This provision, not included in § 504, is intended to prevent employers or
service providers from refusing to employ or provide services to an individual who, for
example, has a child who is developmentally disabled, or who volunteers in a community
program serving individuals with AIDS. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 30. An
employer or provider of services is not, however, required to provide reasonable accom-
1242 [Vol. 57: 1237
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Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination by private em-
ployers against a qualified person with a disability.20 Such an
individual is a person with a disability who, either with or with-
out a reasonable accommodation, is able to perform the essential
functions of the job she holds or desires.30 This does not mean
that the individual must be able to perform all job-related tasks
but only those that are fundamental to the position. 31 In addi-
tion, the employer is required to make reasonable accommoda-
tions that would permit the individual to perform the job in
question.32 Reasonable accommodations include making existing
facilities accessible to and usable by that employee or applicant,
as well as:
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment
to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or de-
vices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, train-
ing materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or inter-
preters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.3
An employer is not required to make an accommodation if
she can prove that making an accommodation would impose an
"undue hardship" on the operation of the business.3 Factors in-
cluded in determining whether a specific accommodation would
present an undue hardship include the "nature and cost of the
accommodation needed," the "overall financial resources of the
facility" and of any larger owning entity, the effect on resources,
and any other impact on the operation of the facility.35 Accord-
ingly, a large corporation may be required to make an accommo-
dation that would be deemed unreasonable for a smaller, inde-
pendently owned business. 38 In addition, even if one type of
modations to such persons if they do not have disabilities themselves. Id.
29 § 102(a).
§ 101(8). An exception is made if an individual would pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of others, provided that the threat cannot be eliminated through reason-
able accommodation. § 101(3).
31 § 101(8). For example, driving would be an essential function for a bus driver, it
would not be an essential function for a counselor at a halfway house who might occa-
sionally be required to drive a client to a doctor's appointment.
u § 102(b)(5)(A) & (B).
§ 101(9)(B).
4§ 102(b)(5)(A).
§ 101(10)(B).
26 SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 36.
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accommodation were judged to be unreasonable, the employer
might be able to make other, less expensive accommodations
that would still allow the employee to fulfill the functions of her
position. 7
The ADA also prohibits discrimination in other areas of em-
ployment under Title I, including the manner in which employ-
ment tests, qualifications standards or other selection proce-
dures are .administered, in the provision of insurance to
employees, and in the inquiry into the physical or mental ability
of an applicant or employee to perform the job. " This title be-
comes effective on July 26, 1992, for employers of twenty-five or
more employees, and on July 26, 1994, for employers of fifteen
or more employees.3 9
Title III of the ADA, which also extends to discrimination
in the private sector, prohibits discrimination in the private pro-
vision of accommodation or services to the public. 40 The ADA
specifies twelve categories of covered private entities that supply
public accommodations or services. 41 Included under these cate-
gories are entities such as grocery stores, zoos, day care centers,
" Id. at 31. This accommodation need not be the best accommodation possible, but
must be one that enables the employee to perform the duties of her job. Employers
must, however, consider all possible accommodations before firing or refusing to hire an
individual. Id. at 31-32.
38 ADA, §§ 102(b)(6), (c)(2)-(4), & 501(c).
9§§ 101(5)(A) & 108.
40 §§ 301-310.
41 § 301(7). As listed in the House Judiciary Report, the categories are:
1. Places of lodging
2. Establishments serving food or drink
3. Places of exhibition or entertainment
4. Places of public gathering
5. Establishments selling or renting items
6. Establishments providing services
7. Stations used for public transportation
8. Places of public display or collection
9. Places of recreation
10. Places of education
11. Establishments providing social services
12. Places of exercise or recreation.
H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 54 (1990) [hereinafter JUDICIARY REPORT].
Categories 9 and 12, although similar, are meant to indicate different types of facilities.
"Places of recreation" is intended to include "a park, zoo, [or] amusement park," while
"places of exercise or recreation" is intended to cover establishments such as "a gymna-
sium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation."
ADA § 301(7)(I), (L).
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hotels, restaurants, professional offices, adoption agencies and
bowling alleys.42 These entities are prohibited from discriminat-
ing against individuals with disabilities in a manner that would
prevent "the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, fa-
cilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation." 43 To prevent discrimination, covered
entities must provide auxiliary aids and services to those indi-
viduals who need them and remove architectural and communi-
cation barriers when such provision or removal is "readily
achievable. 44
Titles IE and HI, which went into effect on January 26, 1992,
cover all forms of transportation (except air travel) provided by
either public or private entities.45 They require all new buses
and rail cars to be physically accessible to individuals with disa-
bilities and prohibit any actions that would deprive a person
with a disability of the full and equal enjoyment of transporta-
tion services.46 In addition, they require public entities operating
a fixed-route system to provide paratransit and special transpor-
-1 § 307. Certain entities are exempted from these provisions, namely private clubs
and establishments that are exempted from coverage under title 11 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as well as religious organizations and entities controlled by religious organi-
zations. Id.
43 §302(a). Covered entities must provide goods or services that are equal to those
given to other individuals and that are not different or separate from those provided to
other individuals (except as necessary to provide services as effective as those provided
to others). § 302(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). In addition, they may not use administrative methods
or eligibility criteria that tend to discriminate on the basis of disability, nor fail to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when they are needed to
make services available to individuals with disabilities (unless such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods or services). § 302(b)(2)(A)(i) & (ii).
44 § 302(b)(2)(A)(iii)-(v). Auxiliary aids and services are the means of assistance nec-
essary to accommodate individuals with disabilities in order to allow them to participate
equally in public accommodations or services. For example, a restaurant would be re-
quired to provide either a brailled menu or someone to read the menu to a blind patron.
Business owners are not required to make an accommodation if it is not readily achieva-
ble, specifically, if it is not "easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without
much difficulty or expense." § 301(9). However, all new construction and alterations to
existing facilities must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabili-
ties. § 303(a)-(b).
-- § 222-228, 242 & 304.
46 §§ 222, 224, 228, 242(a) & (b), 302(2)(B)-(D), 304, 305, 306(a) & (d)(2). In addi-
tion, the ADA requires that operators make good faith efforts to buy used vehicles that
are accessible and to ensure that any remanufactured vehicles are made accessible to
individuals with disabilities. § 222(b) & (c).
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
tation services4" and require all providers to make all new facili-
ties (including stations) and existing stations that are major
transfer points and end-of-the-line stations accessible to individ-
uals with disabilities. 8
Title II also prohibits discrimination on the basis of disabil-
ity by all state and local government entities; it extends the pro-
tections of Titles I and III to individuals working for or seeking
services from any state or local government entity.49 The entities
are defined to include any state or local government, and any
agency, department, or other instrumentality of any state or lo-
cal government.8 In addition to providing the same accommoda-
tions required of private entities in Titles I and III, governments
are required to take the actions necessary to prevent discrimina-
tion in the provision of services.5 1 Due to their size and re-
sources, state and local governments may also be required to
provide accommodations for individuals that a similarly sized
private employer might not be required to make. 2
41 Paratransit services include providing special buses or vans along a fixed route
system, enabling individuals who need the assistance of another person to board, ride or
disembark from a vehicle, or persons who are unable to get to a normal boarding loca-
tion, to use the fixed-route system. Id. § 223. Individuals requiring assistance may in-
clude individuals with vision impairments, individuals with mobility impairments who
require assistance other than the operation of a wheelchair lift, and individuals with
mental disabilities who need someone to tell them when they have reached their desired
destination.
48 §§ 223(a), 226, 242(e)(1), 227(b)(1)-(2) & 242(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). See also HR. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 28 - 33 (1990) [hereinafter PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION REPORT]; H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 at 41, 51-2
(1990) [hereinafter ENERGY AND COMMERCE REPORT]. Existing stations that are not major
transfer points or end-of-line stations need not be made accessible.
49 § 202.
50 § 202(1). In addition, § 502 explicitly sets forth that states shall not be able to
claim Eleventh Amendment immunity from a court action arising under this Act; a state
shall be liable for the same legal and equitable remedies as any public or private defend-
ant who violates the ADA. Section 502 was specifically intended to meet the require-
ments of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). JUDICIARY REPORT,
supra note 41, at 72 (citing Atascadero) (legislature must clearly state intention of stat-
ute to remove 11th Amendment immunity).
" § 202. In order to prevent discrimination, governments are encouraged to educate
public employees about disabilities. JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 41, at 50. For exam-
ple, individuals with epilepsy are often arrested and jailed inappropriately because police
officers have not been trained to recognize and aid an individual who is having a seizure.
Often, after arrest, these individuals are not allowed to take their medication while in
jail, leading to further seizures. Training public employees about disabilities would pre-
vent this type of discrimination. Id.
" For example, a privately run day-care center might not be required to make a
(Vol. 57:1237
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Title IV of the ADA makes telecommunications services and
public service announcements accessible to individuals with
hearing and speech impairments. Common carriers of telecom-
munications services will be required to make intrastate and in-
terstate telecommunications relay services available to individu-
als with speech and hearing impairments.53 These services will
permit individuals with hearing or speech impairments to com-
municate with individuals who do not have impairments. This is
usually done by having an individual with a speech or hearing
impairment communicate with a relay operator via TDD (Tele-
communications Device for the Deaf), while the operator vocally
relays the message to the other party via standard telephone.
Carriers may provide this service themselves, by contracting
with other carriers or in concert with other carriers, but they
may not charge individuals wishing to use the relay services any
additional amount for the service."4 In addition, all television
public service announcements that are produced or funded by
the federal government must now be closed-captioned. 5 The
provisions of Title IV go into effect on July 26, 1993.0'
IL ANALYSIS
A. Expanding the Definition of Reasonable Accommodation
Since the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, there has
been much controversy over the scope of the term "reasonable
accommodation. 057 Specifically, the debate is over whether an
employer must explore reassignment to a vacant position as a
form of reasonable accommodation when other forms of accom-
modation have been unsuccessful. Such a reasonable accommo-
dation means that a reassigned employee would be transferred
to a position similar to the one she was hired to fill;58 preferably,
costly accommodation, while a day-care center run by a large school district might be
required to make the same accommodation. JUDICiRY REPORT, supra note 41, at 51.
- § 401(a).
54 Id.
55 Id. § 402.
16 Id. § 401(a) (amending Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 225(c)).
'7 See text accompanying notes 64-86 infra.
HR. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 63, 65-66 (1990) [hereinafter
EDUCATION AND LABOR REPoRT]. This does not mean that the job must have the same
duties as the original position, but that the employee should not be demoted as a result
of her disability. The employer should first attempt to transfer the employee laterally to
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it should be at the same job and salary level as the original posi-
tion. Reassignment would enable the employee to continue to be
a productive part of the work force while requiring little or no
other accommodation on the part of the employer.
After several years of conflict, federal administrative agen-
cies finally resolved their differences in interpreting the Rehabil-
itation Act in 1986, deciding that an employer must reassign an
employee with a disability to a vacant position if other forms of
accommodation have failed."' Courts, however, have continued
to hold that an employer does not have a duty to reassign under
the Rehabilitation Act.60 These decisions have frequently relied
on the fact that reassignment would violate a collective bargain-
ing agreement, thus causing an undue hardship to the employer
and to other employees. These decisions are contrary to Title
VII case law, which has held that collective bargaining agree-
ments cannot prohibit remedies required under Title VII 1
Congress attempted to prevent such a split between deci-
sion-making bodies by identifying job reassignment as a form of
reasonable accommodation in the ADA. 2 Accordingly, the case
law previously developed in resolving Rehabilitation Act failure-
to-reassign claims should not be used by courts in determining
similar claims brought under the ADA. Instead, the courts
should look to the reports accompanying the ADA, in which the
House and Senate describe the standards that should be used
when determining whether reassignment is an appropriate form
of reasonable accommodation.6
a position she could fill. See id.
'9 See text accompanying notes 64-74 infra.
80 See text accompanying notes 75-86 infra.
61 See text accompanying notes 108-109 infra.
62 ADA § 101(9)(B). See text accompanying note 33 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 87-91 infra.
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1. Courts' Confusion Regarding Whether the Rehabilita-
tion Act's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement In-
cludes Job Reassignment
a. EEOC and MSPB Policy
Many cases arising under section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act are heard by either the Merit Systems Protection Board
(hereinafter MSPB) or the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter EEOC). 4 The MSPB is a federal body
responsible for reviewing federal employers' decisions involving
civil service law, while the EEOC is responsible for enforcing
anti-discrimination law. 5 Prior to 1976 the two federal agencies
took opposite stances on whether job reassignment was a re-
quired form of reasonable accommodation. EEOC regulations
and decisions stated that reassignment was required, while the
MSPB consistently held that reassignment was beyond the
scope of the Rehabilitation Act. 17
In 1986 a special panel of the MSPB resolved this issue
when it reviewed the different decisions reached by the EEOC
and MSPB in the case of Ignacio v. United States Postal Ser-
vice.68 The special panel generally only looks at "whether the
substance of the EEOC's decision with which the MSPB dis-
agrees was actually predicated on a misinterpretation of civil
Section 501 covers the federal government and federal administrative agencies. 29
U.S.C. § 791 (1988).
11 Richard J. Ericson, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of the Handicapped
Federal Employee: Extending the Legal Duty of the Employer. Ignacio v. United State3
Postal Serv., 10 GEO. MASON U. L REv. 267 (1987).
" For a discussion of reasonable accommodation, see text accompanying notes 32-37
supra.
17 See Ignacio v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Petition No. 03840005 at 13
(Sept. 4, 1984) (available on microfiche in EEOC Decisions (IHS), at 1189/A-13); Orias v.
Department of Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03820090 (Nov. 8, 1983) (available on micro-
fiche in EEOC Decisions (IHS) at 1087/B-08); Alvarado v. United State3 Postal Serv.,
EEOC Petition No. 03830052 (Oct. 13, 1983) (available on microfiche in EEOC Decisions
(IHS) at 1165/F-09). Cf. Whitaker v. United States Postal Serv., 29 M.S.P.B. 638 (1986);
Hong Woo v. Department of Navy, 27 M.S.P.B. 203 (1985); Ignacio v. United States
Postal Serv., 16 M.S.P.B. 530 (1983).
30 M.S.P.B. 471 (Special Panel 1986). The special panel is composed of a chair
appointed by the President and one member each of the EEOC and MSPB, and it re-
views all cases in which the MSPB has determined that an EEOC decision misinterprets
civil service law or that the EEOC has reached a civil service decision that is not sup-
ported by the evidence presented. See Ericson, supra note 65, at 267.
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service law."89 In Ignacio the panel needed to decide whether
the EEOC had misinterpreted civil service law by requiring fed-
eral employers to reassign employees with disabilities to vacant
positions when other forms of accommodation had been unsuc-
cessful.70 Upon review, the panel concluded that the EEOC's in-
terpretation of the Rehabilitation Act requiring an employer to
consider reassignment was a reasonable interpretation of the
Act.71
However, the special panel did not rule that an employer
must reassign an employee with a disability but only that the
employer must consider reassignment.72 Thus, an employer still
has the opportunity to show that reassigning an employee would
constitute an "undue hardship." In Carter v. Tisch, a Fourth
Circuit case following Ignacio, the court held that this duty to
consider reassignment does not mean that reassignment is re-
quired under the regulations.73 Accordingly, to avoid a discrimi-
nation claim, employers under the Rehabilitation Act need only
show that they considered reassigning an employee with a disa-
bility before termination and that the reassignment would have
posed an undue hardship.74 Thus, while the Ignacio decision
seemingly expanded the responsibility of federal employers,
courts have pulled the teeth with which it could have protected
employees with disabilities.
b. Case Law
Despite the EEOC's interpretation of section 501, federal
courts have consistently ruled that job reassignment is not a re-
quired form of reasonable accommodation.7 5 In one of the earli-
est cases, the Tenth Circuit held that if an individual's disability
prevented her from performing the duties required in her job
classification, she was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped
person" under the Rehabilitation Act. 6 This interpretation of
01 Ignacio, 30 M.S.P.B. at 481.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 486-87.
72 Id. at 475.
73 822 F.2d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 1987).
71 See Ericson, supra note 65, at 280. See also notes 75-86 and accompanying text
infra.
" See text accompanying notes 76-86 infra.
7' Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984). See also
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"otherwise qualified handicapped person" would preclude job
reassignment as a form of reasonable accommodation; unless an
individual is "otherwise qualified" for the original job in ques-
tion, the protections of the Rehabilitation Act do not apply."7
In the same case, the court also determined that the Postal
Service was unable to reduce the plaintiff's duties or reassign
her to another position, as such actions would have violated the
seniority terms of a collective bargaining agreement.78 Because
she did not have the requisite seniority to hold a light duty posi-
tion under the agreement, such reassignment would have inter-
fered with the rights of other employees.79 This belief that abid-
ing by the terms of collective bargaining agreements is more
important than preserving individuals' civil rights has been re-
stated by federal courts across the nation."
Southwestern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) ("An otherwise
qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his
handicap."); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Hari. 1980) (the only
relevant test in determining whether an applicant is a qualified handicapped individual
is whether the person is capable of performing the tasks required in the job applied for);
Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1188 (D. Md. 1985) (the "position in question" is the
present position occupied).
The relevant part of § 504 states, "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with handi-
caps... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity ... conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service."
29 U.S.C. § 794. A "qualified handicapped individual" is defined as "a handicapped per-
son who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the Essential functions
of the position in question .... "29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(0.
7 The circular reasoning surrounding the term "otherwise qualified" has been noted
by Professor Tate. To be covered by the Rehabilitation Act, an individual with a disabil-
ity has to be "otherwise qualified" to hold the position in question "with or without"
reasonable accommodation by the employer, i.e., if the individual did not have a disabil-
ity, that person would be viewed as qualified to hold the job. Because the employee
seeking to be reassigned admittedly is unable to fulfill the duties of the position origi-
nally held, under some courts' analysis the employee is no longer "qualified" to hold the
job in question. Tate, supra note 7, at 838-39. However, as reassignment is now a form of
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, in addition to determining whether the em-
ployee is qualified for the original position, the employer and court must also determine
whether the employee would be qualified to hold any position to which the employee
could be reassigned.
The ADA uses the term "qualified individual with a disability" and defines it as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."
ADA § 101(8).
1 Daubert, 733 F.2d at 1370.
7" Id.
So See Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989) (reassigning employee to dif-
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The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that reassign-
ment is a valid means of reasonable accommodation."' In School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Court noted that:
Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accom-
modation for a handicapped employee. Although they are not re-
quired to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the
job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative
employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's
existing policies.82
Because this interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act only sug-
gests that employers reassign an employee if another job is "rea-
sonably available," lower courts have continued to hold that job
reassignment is not required if it violates a collective bargaining
agreement. In Davis v. United States Postal Service, the district
court read Arline as being consistent with this evaluation,
because:
[T]he collective bargaining agreement and the Postal Service's regula-
tions do not make the non-entry level positions which plaintiff seeks
reasonably available to him. In fact, these positions are unavailable to
all entry level workers unless no employee secures the position
through the contractually required bidding process."
ferent position would "violate the collective bargaining rights of other employees");
Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (reassigning an employee to a position
he was not entitled to might interfere with the rights of other employees under the col-
lective bargaining agreement); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251-
52 (6th Cir. 1985) ("An employer cannot be required to accommodate a handicapped
employee by restructuring a job in a manner which would usurp the legitimate rights of
other employees in a collective bargaining agreement."); Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp.
1418 (D. Conn. 1987) (collective bargaining agreements are factors to consider in decid-
ing reasonableness of a proposed accommodation); Hurst v. United States Postal Serv.,
653 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (reassignment to position governed by seniority
system not within scope of Act); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1188-89 (D. Md.
1985) (preferential reassignment could violate other employees' rights under a collective
bargaining agreement). See also Davis v. United States Postal Sere., 675 F. Supp. 225
(M.D. Pa. 1987) (no duty to reassign applicant to non-entry-level position as defined in
collective bargaining agreement); Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 486 (W.D. Tenn.
1986) (no obligation to transfer employee from current position to another which em-
ployee would be able to perform even where collective bargaininng agreement provides
procedures for reassignment).
81 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (school teacher sus-
ceptible to tuberculosis is "handicapped individual" and if qualified must be afforded
reasonable accommodation).
82 Id. at 289 n.19.
83 675 F. Supp. 225, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
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The court relied on the fact that the positions Davis sought and
could have performed were not available to other entry-level em-
ployees. 4 The Court held that section 501 did not require em-
ployers to make exceptions to existing policy or reassign individ-
uals with disabilities to positions that would not normally be
available to employees without seniority."5
Thus, although courts have acknowledged that job reassign-
ment may be a valid form of reasonable accommodation, few
have been willing to afford the method sufficient authority to
override existing policy or collective bargaining agreements. 0
Accordingly, individuals choosing to pursue a private right of ac-
tion in court to avoid administrative delays and procedural limi-
tations will have their cases resolved differently from those
choosing a purely administrative resolution to the case: a plain-
tiff choosing the more time-consuming administrative route will
have the case settled using EEOC and MSPB policy that sup-
ports reassignment, while those going to court will face the cur-
rent anti-reassignment case law. The courts' reading not only
defeats the goal of predictability, but it also limits the Rehabili-
tation Act's intended prohibition of discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities.
2. Job Reassignment as a Form of Reasonable Accommo-
dation Under the ADA
a. The Duty to Reassign
In drafting the ADA, Congress explicitly included job reas-
signment as a required form of reasonable accommodation."
U Id. at 234.
Id. Other post-Arline cases include: Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (lst Cir.
1989) (Arline only applies if policies for reassignment are already in place; otherwise,
reassignment would violate collective bargaining agreement); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d
465, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (Arline applies only to existing policies for reassignment).
88 One district court has refused to allow collective bargaining agreements to super-
sede employee civil rights. In Rhone v. United States Dep't of Army, 665 F. Supp. 734
(E.D. Mo. 1987), the Eastern District of Missouri held that EEOC regulations required
reassignment as a form of reasonable accommodation and that most reassignment could
be dealt with under collective bargaining agreements through provisions requiring nego-
tiations to resolve personnel problems. Id. at 743-46. See also Coley v. Secretary of
Army, 689 F. Supp. 519, 523 (D. Md. 1987) (because efforts must be made to reassign
employee to another position, the term "position in question" refers to all the positions
to which he could be assigned).
§ 101(9)(B).
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The definition of reasonable accommodation includes:
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or in-
terpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities. 8
The House Education and Labor Report and the Senate Re-
port accompanying the ADA explicitly discussed job restructur-
ing as a form of reasopable accommodation: 9
The legislation specifies that discrimination includes the failure by a
covered entity to make reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability.... Reasonable accommodation may also include re-
assignment to a vacant position. If an employee, because of disability,
can no longer perform the essential functions of the job that she or he
has held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is qual-
ified may prevent the employee from being out of work and employer
from losing a valuable worker. Efforts should be made, however, to
accommodate an employee in the position that he or she was hired to
fill before reassignment is considered. The Committee also wishes to
88 Id. (emphasis added). Compare this to the language of the regulations imple-
mented to enforce the Rehabilitation Act:
(b) Reasonable accommodation may include, but shall not be limited to: (1)
making facilities readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons; and
(2) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification
of examinations, the provision of readers and interpreters, and other similar
actions.
29 C.F.R. § 1613.704. This list of possible accommodations did not include reassignment
as a form of reasonable accommodation. Instead, the notion of reassignment came from
the United States Office of Personnel Management's Handbook on Reasonable Accom-
modation, which explains the accommodations listed in the EEOC regulations in less
technical terms. In the section of the handbook discussing what federal employers should
do if a current employee becomes disabled after employment, it states as one alternative
course of action:
Reassignment: The employee's work experience and education may indicate
that he or she can perform satisfactorily in another position. Under certain
circumstances, an exception may be made to normal qualification standards to
facilitate reassignment. Reassignment need not necessarily be limited to posi-
tions of the same grade or series. The possibility that the employee would be
willing to accept reassignment to a lower grade position with less strenuous
physical or mental demands is not to be overlooked.
U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, HANDBOOK ON REASONABLE AccoMIMODATION 10.
8' EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 62-63; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 23, at 31.
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make clear the reassignment need only be to a vacant position-
"bumping" another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is
not required.90
The Senate Report placed a limitation on job reassignment,
stating that it is available only to individuals who, because of a
disability, are no longer able to satisfactorily perform the duties
of the position they currently hold."1
It is important to note that while reassignment is a required
form of reasonable accommodation, it should only be considered
as a last resort.92 Therefore, when it would be possible to accom-
modate an employee by job restructuring or modifying the em-
ployee's work schedule, such avenues must be pursued before
reassigning the employee to another position. This situation
would arise if a fact pattern similar to the one in Taylor v. De-
partment of the Army were to arise in a case under the ADA.'"
In Taylor a mail clerk suffered an injury causing stiffness and
loss of strength in her hands. A year after the onset of her disa-
bility, Taylor was promoted to the position of medical clerk
(typist). Unable to type because of her disability, she acted pri-
marily as a receptionist while another clerk-typist performed all
typing duties. 5 When Taylor's supervisor learned that she did
not type, the supervisor attempted to fire her because she was
physically unable to perform her duties.9 6 The MSPB decided
that because it was unreasonable for the Army to have promoted
an employee with a hand injury to a typing position, the Army
had to reinstate her to her former position as mail clerk."
90 EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 62-63.
9' SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 32. In addition, neither report says that an
employee cannot be "bumped" from a position to create a vacancy for an employee with
a disability;, they merely state that such an action is not required. Id. at 32; EDUCATIoN
AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 63 ("reassignment need only be to a vacant posi-
tion---'bumping' another employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required").
Thus, should an employer wish to accommodate an employee with a disability by trans-
ferring another employee, such reassignment may be within the scope of reasonable ac-
commodation, albeit not required.
92 EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 63 ("[ejfforts should be made,
however, to accommodate an employee in the position that he or she was hired to fill
before reassignment is considered.")
93 rd.
' 27 M.S.P.B. 90 (1985).
95 Id. at 91-92.
" Id. at 92.
97 Id. at 93.
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If this case were to be decided under the ADA, the employer
(and the MSPB) would have to attempt to accommodate Taylor
by other means before reassigning her to another position. 8
First, it would not be unreasonable to promote an employee with
a hand injury to a "typing" position if a modified keyboard or
another alternative input device (auxiliary aid) would allow her
to perform the functions of a typist.99 If this accommodation was
not successful or possible because of the type of injury, the em-
ployer would be required to allow the type of job restructuring
devised by Taylor and her co-worker. Since both employees
were, as a team, able to complete the tasks assigned to each of
them, the employer suffered no ill effects as a result of the re-
structuring. 00 Accordingly, under the ADA, the employer would
be required to allow, if not actively encourage, this type of job
restructuring. 1' 0 If job restructuring had not enabled Taylor and
her co-worker to satisfactorily perform their duties, then the em-
ployer would have been required to reassign Taylor to another
position. 0 2
" See EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 63.
The ADA prohibits "limiting... a job applicant or employee in a way that ad-
versely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant.., because of the disability
of such applicant or employee." § 102(b)(1). Although there may be other opportunities
for promotion other than to clerk-typist, this promotion would be reasonable as long as
accommodation could be provided. Similarly, if an alternative aid, such as a special type
of keyboard, could enable an entry-level employee with a hand injury to perform the
duties of a typist, the employer should be required to make the accommodation.
"' Because the employer would be paying two employees anyway-two clerk typ-
ists-the fact that one acted primarily as a clerk and the other primarily as a typist
would not change the fact that two employees were needed to complete the work as-
signed to the two positions.
Although one of the essential functions of the position "clerk-typist" is, presum-
ably, typing, the mere fact that Taylor was unable to type would not render her unquali-
fied for the job. Section 101(8) of the ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability
as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires." Because the definition of reasonable accommodation includes "job restructur-
ing," § 101(9)(B), the definition of qualified individual can be read as "an individual with
a disability who, with . . . reasonable accomodation, [including job restructuring,] can
perform the essential functions . . . " §101(8). Because restructuring the clerk-typist
positions enabled Taylor (and the other typist) to satisfactorily perform the duties of her
(their) position(s), she was qualified to hold the position of medical clerk-typist under
the ADA.
'02 Although this position would have to be one Taylor was qualified to hold, it
would not necessarily have to be the position from which Taylor was originally trans-
ferred. Because Taylor was promoted before her disability was discovered, under the
ADA, efforts should be made to transfer her to a position of equal salary and job grade
[Vol. 67: 12371256
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b. Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements
Both the House and Senate addressed the issue of collective
bargaining agreements in their reports.10 3 While both houses rec-
ognized that collective bargaining agreements might be relevant
when determining whether a particular job reassignment is rea-
sonable, such an agreement "would not be determinative on the
issue. 10 4 Accordingly, a collective bargaining agreement that es-
tablished seniority guidelines for certain positions could be con-
sidered when deciding whether reassigning an employee with a
disability who does not have seniority is a reasonable accommo-
dation. 10 5 The presence of that agreement, however, should not
be used as the sole factor for finding reassignment
unreasonable.106
To eliminate this conflict entirely, Congress, in its reports
explaining the provisions of the ADA, encouraged employers and
unions negotiating collective bargaining agreements after the ef-
fective date of the ADA to include a provision that would permit
employers to "take all actions necessary to comply with this leg-
islation. 1 0 7 Because a suit could arise under the ADA immedi-
ately upon its effective date, it would be prudent for employers
to take note of this advice now, so that ADA compliance provi-
sions will be included in the collective bargaining agreements
that are operative when the ADA takes effect.
Even if employers were to ignore Congress's recommenda-
tion, the Supreme Court has held that the policies promoted by
civil rights statutes are sufficient to override the interests of
other employees and collective bargaining agreements. In
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., the Supreme Court
before demoting her to her original position.
103 EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 63; SENATE REoRT, supra note
23, at 32. The ADA itself, however, does not discuss this issue.
Collective bargaining agreements are the contracts negotiated between a union and
management, specifying salary grades for certain job levels, the seniority required for
certain jobs, amount of vacation and sick leave for employees, and similar issues affect-
ing employment.
104 EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 63. The Senate Report states
that a collective bargaining agreement "may be considered as a factor in determining
whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability with-
out seniority to that job." SENATE REPORT, supra note 23, at 32.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 63.
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held that one of the goals of Title VII is to make victims of dis-
crimination whole; if the only way to make a plaintiff whole is
for the court to grant retroactive seniority as well as back pay,
then collective bargaining agreements should be overridden. 10 8
The Court's rationale-that Congress viewed prohibiting dis-
crimination as having the highest priority-would seem to apply
to the ADA as well. While the Rehabilitation Act is very limited
in scope-it applies only to entities funded with federal
money-the ADA has the same broad coverage as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act and refers to Title VII in describing its en-
forcement provisions.109 Accordingly, while courts may have
been hesitant to invoke the broadest powers of Congress to over-
ride contractual agreements to enforce the provisions of the Re-
habilitation Act, they should accord the ADA the same power as
the Supreme Court has granted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Both Congress's discussion of collective bargaining and the
Title VII case law suggest that most Rehabilitation Act reassign-
ment cases decided by the federal courts would have been de-
cided differently under the ADA. Although some courts have
stated that collective bargaining agreements are only factors to
be considered in determining whether an accommodation is rea-
sonable, they have found the existence of a seniority provision in
108 424 U.S. 747, 763-72 (1976). In Franks, a Title VII racial discrimination case,
plaintiffs sought an award of retroactive seniority as part of their damages. Defendants
argued that awarding seniority to employees who had not been working in the seniority-
earning position (determined to be a result of discrimination) would violate collective
bargaining agreements.
The Court also stated: "in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Con-
gress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in em-
ployment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national
origin ... and ordained that its policy of outlawing such discrimination should have the
'highest priority.'" Id. at 763 (citations ommitted).
1*1 Congress states that the purposes of the ADA are:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to ad-
dress the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.
§ 2(b) (emphasis added).
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the collective bargaining agreement sufficient to determine that
a reassignment is unreasonable. 110 As the presence of a collective
bargaining agreement was the sole reason invoked against reas-
signment in the Postal Service decisions, similar cases brought
under the ADA should require reassignment."'
If the ADA is to be enforced and used to its full power,
courts must begin to look at the breadth of other civil rights
statutes and prohibit discrimination against individuals with
disabilities as Congress intended. While the Rehabilitation Act
was a step in the right direction, because of its very limited
scope-it only applied to those employers who were tied to the
federal government in some way-courts may have been hesitant
to interpret it as broadly as they had interpreted Title VII. By
passing the ADA, Congress has sent a clear message that dis-
crimination against individuals is not acceptable in this society.
The courts must not run from the responsibility Congress has
placed upon them, but instead must face the challenge to pro-
tect the interests of individuals with disabilities, even at the risk
of burdening employers.
Under the ADA, an individual who develops a disability
that prevents her from continuing to work at her current job will
not immediately become unemployed, as is often the case today.
Instead, her employer will have to examine all possible options
available to keep the employee with a disability in the company.
Should job restructuring or other accommodation not be ade-
quate to accommodate the employee, the employer must explore
fully the possibility of reassigning the employee before deciding
to terminate her. While reassignment will not always be feasible,
it will at least enable some individuals with disabilities to re-
main employed even after their ability to perform the tasks of
their original position is impaired.
110 See Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F. Supp. 225, 235 (M.D. Pa. 1937).
See also Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987) (although collective bargain-
ing agreement does not supersede federal law, its provisions must be considered when
analyzing reasonableness of accommodation). The only other factors courts considered
were the reasons employers and employees usually enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments, such as to allow for career advancement of employees and to attract and retain
management-level personneL See, e.g., Dauis, 675 F. Supp. at 235.
... See notes 94-102 supra.
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B. Prohibition of Preemployment Medical Examinations and
Implications Regarding Genetic Screening
The ADA also prohibits an employer practice that was not
covered under the language of the Rehabilitation Act it-
self-preemployment medical examinations. While some of the
federal agencies promulgating regulations pursuant to the Reha-
bilitation Act included prohibitions on medical testing, the pro-
visions were inconsistent and inadequate to prevent discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability.112 Such prohibitions are especially
important today as more employers are screening applicants for
potential future health risks. 113 Not only can employers screen
out applicants who may be unable to perform their jobs some-
time in the future, but they can also minimize the potential lia-
bility and insurance costs related to hiring these workers. A 1982
survey by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
[hereinafter OTA] showed that 4.6 percent of the major employ-
ers surveyed had used biochemical or cytogenetic tests in the
past, 1.6 percent were currently testing applicants, and 16.1 per-
11 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1983) (Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
regulations enforcing § 503);45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1983) (Health and Human Services regu-
lations for enforcing § 504).
Neither of these provisions prohibits conducting preemployment medical examina-
tions or inquiries entirely. The § 504 regulations require only that, if preemployment
medical examinations are required, they be conducted only after an offer of employment
has been made conditional on accceptable results, and that they be required of all appli-
cants; they need not even demondtrate that the information obtained from the examina-
tion is relevant to the applicant's ability to perform job-related activities. 45 C.F.R. §§
84.14(c). This provision neither prohibits preemployment inquiry nor sets up a stringent
standard by which testing can be judged. Tests do not need to be a business necessity,
nor must they relate to the ability to perform the essential functions of the job; the tests
are not even required to be highly predictive of injury or inability to perform the job. Id.
See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 117 (1984).
The § 503 regulation appears weaker on the surface, allowing preemployment exami-
nation of applicants with disabilities even if examinations are not required of all appli-
cants. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3). However, if the testing tends to screen out qualified
individuals with disabilities, "the requirements shall be related to the specific job or jobs
for which the individual is being considered and shall be consistent with business neces-
sity and the safe performance of the job." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(1). Applying the § 503
business necessity test to medical examinations and screening procedures, the methods
used "(1) must have a scientifically valid basis, (2) must have a high predictive value,
and (3) must be the most accurate and least onerous alternative." ROTHSTEIN, supra, at
118.
113 A discussion of genetic screening and testing for future health risks follows at
text accompanying notes 130-35 infra.
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cent expected to begin testing within the next five years.114
Moreover, as technology has advanced, it is likely that many
more employers are genetically screening applicants today.""0
In addition, there has been some debate as to the Rehabili-
tation Act's applicability to an individual who does not currently
have a disability, but who is at risk of developing a specific disa-
bility in the future.116 Because the Rehabilitation Act was in-
tended to be narrow in scope, some argue that including these
individuals under its coverage would be contrary to legislative
intent.117 The ADA, in contrast, was intended to be a broad anti-
discrimination law, equal in scope and protection to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,118 and therefore would cover such
114 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESsMENT, US. CONGRESS, THE ROLE OF GENETIC TEST-
ING IN THE PREVENTION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (1983) (hereinafter OTA STUDY]. The
OTA conducted an anonymous survey of the "Fortune 500" companies, eleven major
labor unions, and fifty of the biggest private utilities. Approximately 65 percent of those
companies targeted responded to the survey. Id at 9. Because of the anonymous nature
of the survey, it was impossible to tell if screening is more prevalent in some industries
than in others. However, it is possible that the use of screening is higher than suggested
by the study, as one trade association reportedly attempted to discourage corporate par-
ticipation in the survey. Richard Severo, 59 Top U.S. Companies Plan Genetic Screen-
ing, N.Y. Tirms, June 23, 1982, at A12. In addition, the study was conducted in 1982, and
respondents were only looking ahead to possible practices by 1987; no later studies have
been done to document the current prevalence of genetic screening by employers.
"I Since 1983 researchers have been able to study DNA to identify genetic markers
for Huntington's disease and other disorders. In addition, geneticists are now using these
same technologies to look at an individual's predisposition to nonoccupational illnesses.
MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 72-76
(1989). Accordingly, besides being able to screen for work-related risks, employers are
now able to screen for individuals who are predisposed towards heart disease or other
illnesses, and thereby cut general health insurance costs.
"I See, e.g., Katherine Brokaw, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employ-
ers' Liability, 23 COLUM J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 317 (1990) (not settled whether Rehabilita-
tion Act would protect genetically susceptible individuals); Edith F. Canter, Employ-
ment Discrimination Implications of Genetic Screening in the Workplace Under Title
VII and the Rehabilitation Act, 10 AML J. L. & MED. 323 (1984) (genetically susceptible
individual within scope of Act); Ellen R. Peirce, The Regulation of Genetic Testing in
the Workplace-A Legislative Proposal 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 771 (1985) (genetically suscepti-
ble individual within definition of disability ;) Mark A. Rothstein, Employee Selection
Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 MICH. L REv. 1379 (1983) (case law
unclear whether susceptible individuals covered by Act); Robert Wachbroit, Making the
Grade: Testing for Human Genetic Disorders, 16 HOFSTRA L. Rmv. 583 (1989) (geneti-
cally susceptible individuals not within scope of Act); Laura Rowinski, Note, Genetic
Testing in the Workplace, 4 J. CoNTEbip. HEALTH L. & PoLY 375 (1988) (genetically
susceptible individuals probably not within protected class, and even if they were, busi-
ness necessity defense would exempt employer).
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 112, at 120.
18 See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
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individuals.
Finally, the Rehabilitation Act applies only to federal em-
ployers and employers receiving federal funds through grants
and contracts.'19 Accordingly, only those employers doing busi-
ness with the federal government are prohibited from discrimi-
nating. While the CRRA broadened the coverage of the Rehabil-
itation Act to reach entities receiving federal funds in any part
of their operation, many employers engaging in genetic screening
do not receive any federal money, and therefore are still not
covered.
1. Prohibition Under the ADA
Section 102(c) of the ADA prohibits the most frequently
used technique to discriminate against individuals with cancer,
epilepsy, mental illness, heart disease, diabetes, AIDS and other
"hidden" disabilities-preemployment medical examinations
and inquiries. 120 Employers have frequently required applicants
to complete a medical questionnaire asking about these disabili-
ties at the same time they completed an employment applica-
tion. If applicants refused to complete the questionnaire, they
were ineligible for employment; if they lied, they could be fired
if the truth were later discovered. The ADA now prohibits em-
ployers from screening out applicants who have disabilities that
are immaterial to their qualifications for a job.12 1
Under the ADA, neither public nor private employers are
permitted to conduct preemployment medical examinations, to
ask an applicant whether she has a disability, or to ask about
the nature or severity of a disability. 122 Employers are, however,
allowed to ask an applicant whether she has the ability to per-
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-794 (1988). See note 5 supra.
zo See EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 72. See also note 112 supra.
The Rehabilitation Act does not prohibit preemployment medical examinations, al-
though they are regulated by some agency regulations promulgated pursuant to it. Regu-
lations interpreting § 504 provide that preemployment medical examinations may be re-
quired only if they are required of all employees. 28 C.F.R. § 42.513 (1982). Those
interpreting § 503 are less restrictive, permitting an employer to require preemployment
examinations of applicants with disabilities, even if such examinations are not required
of all applicants. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1983). In both instances, the examinations must
still be job related, promoting "business necessity and safe performance." 29 C.F.R. §
32.14 (1982).
121 ADA § 102(c)(1)-(4).
122 § 102(c)(2)(A).
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form job-related functions. 123 Once an offer of employment has
been made, employers may conduct medical examinations that
are "job-related and consistent with business necessity" and the
job offer may be conditional on the individual being physically
or mentally capable of performing the job.12' If an employer
wishes to test applicants, all applicants must be subject to the
same examination. 12
5
Any information obtained through such testing must be
treated as a confidential medical record. 26 It may only be pro-
vided to supervisors or managers in order to allow them to make
necessary restrictions or accommodations, and to safety person-
nel if the disability might require emergency treatment. 27 In ad-
dition, information may be released to officials investigating the
employer's compliance with the ADA.1 28 The same restrictions
apply to employers wishing to conduct medical examinations or
inquiries of current employees; an examination is permitted if
all employees are required to submit to an examination, and the
examination is specifically job related and is consistent with bus-
iness necessity. 29
123 § 102(c)(2)(B).
12 § 102(c)(3) (4)(A). Similarly, the testing of current employees is also subject to
these provisions. § 102(c)(4)(A).
21 § 102(c)(3)(A). Employers may also conduct voluntary medical examinations as
part of an employee health program. § 102(c)(4)(B).
This provision differs from the § 504 regulations in three significant ways. First, it
allows examinations only after a conditional job offer has been made. Second, it requires
that the same examination be given to all employees; under the § 504 regulations, it was
not illegal to subject applicants with a disability to examinations that were different
from those given to other applicants. Third, the § 504 regulations only required that the
examinations be relevant to the job in question; the ADA requires that the tests be spe-
cifically job related and consistent with business necessity. The latter part of the require-
ment draws upon the § 503 regulations that if a test tends to screen out applicants with
disabilities, the test must be "related to the specific job or jobs for which the individual
is being considered and shall be consistent with business nebessity and the safe perform-
ance of the job." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1983).
126 ADA § 102(c)(3)(B).
§ 102(c)(3)(B)(i) & (ii).
§ 102(c)(3)(B)(iii).
1129 § 102(c)(4)(A) & (B). Another exception applies if employers wish to conduct
voluntary medical examinations as part of an employee health program that is'available
to employees at the work site. Any information obtained from such an examination is
subject to the same confidentiality requirements as examinations of prospective employ-
ees. § 102(c)(4)(C).
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
2. Genetic Screening and Other Means of Testing for Sus-
ceptibility to Workplace Hazards
Researchers advocated genetic screening in employment as
early as 1963.130 Ten years later, only three United States chemi-
cal companies were using the tests; the researchers again en-
couraged genetic testing in the workplace and suggested testing
for even more traits, including sickle cell trait and alpha1- anti-
trypsin deficiency.131 By 1978 Du Pont had begun testing black
employees for sickle cell trait,132 and by 1982 seventeen of the
companies surveyed by the Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) admitted having used genetic tests within the past twelve
years.13 While there are no current data on genetic testing in
the workplace, advancing technology and increased concerns
about liability and health care costs suggest that more employ-
ers are using genetic tests today than ever before.
Medical testing may refer to two distinct types of tests.
First, there is medical or genetic screening, in which a test is
done to determine the presence or absence of a particular condi-
11o See Herbert E. Stokinger & John T. Mountain, Test for Hypersusceptibility to
Hemolytic Chemicals, 6 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 495, 495-96 (1963).
"I' See Herbert E. Stokinger & L.D. Scheel, Hypersusceptibility and Genetic
Problems in Occupational Medicine-A Consensus Report, 15 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED,
564 (1973).
These two tests were two of the most common screening devices. Sickle cell trait
refers to a person who is heterozygous, or carries one gene for sickle cell anemia (an
individual with sickle cell anemia is homozygous, or has two sickle cell genes). While a
person with sickle cell trait will never develop the anemia, many scientists believe that
an individual with the trait is at an increased risk of blood oxygen deficiency, In addi-
tion, other scientists believe that individuals with the trait are also more susceptible to
hemolytic anemia, therefore they recommend avoiding exposure to anemia producers
such as benzene, lead and cadmium, blood enzyme tension reducers such as cyanide and
carbon monoxide, and methemoglobin formers, such as aromatic amino and nitro com-
pounds. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 112, at 55.
Serum alphal-antitrypsin [hereinafter SAT] is a protein that protects the lung from
certain enzymes. An individual with a SAT deficiency is predisposed to alveolar destruc-
tion and the development of emphysema. Accordingly, an individual with the deficiency
is at increased risk in a dusty environment or an environment with other respiratory
irritants. While individuals who are homozygous for the deficiency are extremely likely
to develop chronic destructive pulmonary disease even without additional irritants, those
who are heterozygous only have a 10 percent chance of becoming ill, even when exposed
to workplace hazards. Id. at 57-58.
132 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 112, at 53; Richard Severo, Du Pont Defends Genetic
Screening, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1981, § 1, at 31.
3 OTA STUDY, supra note 114, at 9.
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tion, gene, or trait that may cause'an illness in the future. 13' Ex-
amples are lower back x-rays for congenital defects, biochemical
genetic tests for the sickle cell gene, and recombinant DNA tests
for Huntington's disease. Genetic screening permits employers
to identify hypersusceptible individuals-individuals who pos-
sess a genetic trait that makes them more likely to become ill
after exposure to a certain substance in the workplace.
The second type of testing is medical monitoring, in which
periodic tests are done to ensure that an employee's exposure to
hazardous substances in the workplace has not had a serious ef-
fect on the employee's health. For example, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (hereinafter OSHA) requires that em-
ployees working with toxic substances be periodically examined
to monitor any effects the toxins may have.3"'
3. Implications of the ADA on Genetic Screening of
Applicants
a. Permissibility of Preemployment Testing for
Hypersusceptibility and Risk of Future Injury
Under the medical examination provision of the ADA, med-
ical testing is allowed if such tests are conducted routinely on all
applicants after a conditional job offer has been made, as long as
the testing is "job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity. ' 136 This would include tests to determine whether an indi-
vidual is physically or mentally able to perform a job. 37 Medical
testing may be permissible under this section if it is used for
monitoring."3 Genetic screening, on the other hand, does not re-
late to an employee's current ability to perform a job, nor does it
alert the employee to a developing condition, or to an overexpo-
sure to a specific health hazard. Instead it may, for example,
identify individuals who have a genetic predisposition toward ill-
"' See Mark A. Rothstein, Medical Screening of Workers: Genetics, AIDS and Be-
yond, 2 LAB. L.J. 675 (1987). Other factors used to predict the likelihood of future illness
are innate characteristics, behavioral factors, general health status, and medical status
related to prior occupational exposure. Id.
135 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 112, at 19. See for example, if an employee were routinely
exposed to lead at the workplace, the employee would be required to submit to yearly
blood tests to measure the levels of lead in the employee's blood.
ADA § 102(c)(4)(A).
§§ 102(c)(2)(B) & 103(a); EDUCATION AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 58, at 73.
Peirce, supra note 116, at 777.
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nesses caused by exposure to certain chemicals.139 Although it
can warn an individual that exposure to a certain substance may
affect her health more than it would affect a co-worker, it does
not mean that the employee will definitely develop the disease,
even if exposed to the chemical. 40 Thus, while the test may alert
the individual to a potential for disease, or to a need for more
frequent monitoring, it does not indicate a current disability or
an incapacity to perform a job. Because such information does
not relate to the applicant's ability to perform her job, genetic
screening, unlike monitoring, is not permitted under the ADA.14
1
Employers may assert that screening out hypersusceptible
applicants is necessary, citing concerns such as future job safety,
increased workers' compensation costs, future liability, health
benefits, and other costs associated with absenteeism, sick leave,
and turnover. 42 While these economic concerns are valid, few
courts have upheld the theory that economic concerns outweigh
employees' civil rights. 43
b. Prohibition of Discrimination Based on Results of Genetic
Tests and the Risk of Future Harm
Even if medical examinations and genetic tests are permit-
ted to enable employers to identify employees who may be more
susceptible to job-related injuries, employers may not use the re-
sults of those tests to discriminate against an individual with a
potential disability.144 Individuals who are hypersusceptible or
M3, See text accompanying notes 112-19 and 130-35 supra.
1M0 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 134, at 677-78. Often, even the increased risk will not
significantly affect the probability that the employee will contract the disease. For exam-
ple, an individual has a genetic trait that increases her risk of illness tenfold. The risk of
that illness in the general population is one in 10,000. Even though the individual's risk
is ten times higher, her absolute risk (one in 1000) is still quite low. Id. at 678.
"I § 102(c)(4)(A).
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not makQ
inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a
disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examina-
tion or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity.
142 Brokaw, supra note 116, at 326.
1M3 For a detailed discussion of the business necessity defense, see text accompany-
ing notes 173-89 infra.
14 During the House floor debate preceding the passage of the ADA, three repre-
sentatives discussed the applicability of the ADA to discrimination based on genetic test-
ing and the risk of future harm. Representative Owens of New York stated:
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who have congenital or other latent disabilities are covered by
the ADA as individuals who are regarded as having a disabil-
ity.145 This definition of disability, the same as the definition
used in the Rehabilitation Act, has been interpreted to include
conditions that currently do not limit an individual (other than
in securing the particular job desired) but which weaken, dimin-
ish or damage an individual's health, or which are perceived by
an employer as weakening, diminishing or damaging one's health
or ability to perform the job in question.""6
In E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, Crosby, an apprentice car-
penter, was denied a position by a general contractor when a
preemployment physical revealed a congenital back anomaly."' 7
Although the condition did not currently impair the carpenter's
ability to perform an apprentice's duties, the company refused
to hire him because the condition made him a "poor risk for
These protections of the ADA will also benefit individuals who are identified
through genetic tests as being carriers of a disease-associated gene. There is a
record of genetic discrimination against such individuals, most recently during
sickle cell screening programs in the 1970's. With the advent of new forms of
genetic testing, it is even more critical that the protections of the ADA be in
place. Under the ADA, such individuals may not be discriminated against sim-
ply because they may not be qualified for a job sometime in the future. The
determination as to whether an individual is qualified must take place at the
time of the employment decision, and may not be based on speculation regard-
ing the future. Moreover, such individuals may not be discriminated against
because they or their children might incur increased health care costs for the
employer.
136 CONG. REc. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990). Representatives Edwards and Waxman
made similar statements regarding the applicability of the ADA to hypersusceptible indi-
viduals. Id. at H4624, H4626-27.
1,' See ADA § 3(2)(A) & (C); SENATE REPORT, supra, note 23, at 24.
The definition of disability includes an individual who is "regarded as having ... an
impairment [that limits one or more major life activity]." Thus, if an individual were not
hired because she tested positive for a certain genetic trait which may make her more
susceptible to on-the-job hazards, the perception by the employer that this individual
has a physical impairment which would prevent her from carrying out her job (and the
subsequent refusal to hire) would make this applicant a person who is "regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment." § 3(2)(C).
146 See E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980) (latent con-
genital back defect is disability if perceive& as such by employer and impairs ability to
secure employment in chosen field). See also Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp.
85 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (employee "unusually sensitive to tobacco smoke" was handi-
capped within meaning of statute).
147 497 F. Supp. at 1091. The anomaly, a partially sacralized transitional vertebra,
occurs in eight to nine percent of the population. While the condition may put him at
risk for possible back injury in the future, there is no agreement in the medical profes-
sion on how large the risk is. Ro'rHsTMN, supra note 112, at 119.
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heavy labor. 1 48 The company still refused to hire him after an
orthopedist wrote a letter to the company, stating that if Crosby
"kept his back and abdominal muscles in good tone, 'he should
be able to perform whatever he prefers.' "149
The Hawaii district court concluded, first, that the appren-
tice was impaired or perceived as impaired under the definitions
of the Rehabilitation Act.150 It held that the broad definition of
an impairment as "any condition which weakens, diminishes, re-
stricts, or otherwise damages an individual's health or physical
or mental activity" was a logical interpretation of impairment,
consistent with Congress's intentions. 51 Because the company
perceived Crosby's condition as weakening, diminishing and re-
stricting his ability to perform jobs involving heavy labor, the
apprentice was clearly impaired or regarded as impaired under
the statute.1
52
Second, the court addressed the requirement that the im-
pairment substantially limit a major life activity of the appren-
tice.153 As working constituted a major life activity under the
Act,154 the court needed to determine how broadly the concept
of securing employment and working should be construed. The
court decided that a person's limitation should be determined by
looking at her particular situation; accordingly, factors to be ex-
amined include the number and type of jobs from which the per-
son is disqualified, the availability of other jobs in the person's
geographical area, and the person's own training and job experi-
ence.155 Accordingly, since Crosby was training to be a carpenter,
,48 497 F. Supp. at 1091.
14 Id. at 1092.
150 Id. at 1098 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(A) & (B)).
Id. at 1098. Looking at the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act, the court
noted that in 1974 Congress amended the statute, adding "is regarded as having such an
impairment" and stating that "[t]heir intent was to protect people who are denied em-
ployment because of an employer's perceptions, whether or not those perceptions are
accurate." Id. at 1097.
182 Id. at 1098.
.3 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B). The provision states that a handicapped individual is a
person who "has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more
of such person's major life activities . . . ." Id.
"' The statute also states that an "individual with handicaps" is one who "has a
physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a sub-
stantial handicap to employment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A).
"1 497 F. Supp. at 1099-1101. If an individual were denied one job but had other
opportunities, she might not be substantially limited. But if she were disqualified from
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should other contractors follow Black's rationale and disqualify
him from all apprentice-level jobs, he would be disqualified from
all jobs within his chosen field. Thus, he was substantially lim-
ited in his ability to secure employment.ae
Although the court refused to decide if and when an em-
ployer could refuse to hire an individual with a disability, believ-
ing that avoiding the possibility of future injury was consistent
with business necessity and safe performance of the job, the
court did say that the risk of future injury "does not make an
otherwise capable person incapable."' u 7 However, the court sug-
gested a high standard for deciding what degree of future risk is
required to find screening consistent with business necessity." 8
The holding that an individual at risk for future injury is
"handicapped" under the Rehabilitation Act if an employer
treats the risk as a disability is equally applicable to other types
of congenital conditions and hypersensitivity. Crosby had an
identified medical condition that did not currently impair his
ability to work, but that might have impaired his ability to work
in the future; this is analogous to most cases of future risk or
hypersusceptibility.59 Although a hypersusceptible person may
not be currently disabled, it is the employer's perception of her
as being incapable of performing the job because of her genetic
predisposition that qualifies her as an individual with a disabil-
ity. While Black was decided under section 503 of the Rehabili-
tation Act rather than under the ADA, the same reasoning
should still apply under the new law, for the definition of the
individuals covered is the same.
Two subsequent circuit court cases also addressed the issue
similar positions by all the employers in her geographical area, she might be substan-
tially limited. For example, if she were trained as a chemist and were disqualified from a
chemistry position, but were able to get a job as a truck driver, she would be considered
substantially limited in her ability to work in her chosen field.
IN Id. at 1102.
157 Id. at 1103. The court refused to decide whether the risk of harm was serious
enough to warrant a valid business necessity defense for lack of sufficient evidence at the
time, and held the issue for further proceedings. Id. at 1104.
"I Id. The court used the example of an individual having a 907o chance of having a
heart attack after working at a particular job for one month. While the individual might
be qualified for the position, screening out this person might be consistent "with busi-
ness necessity and the safe performance of the job." Id.
259 See Peirce, supra note 116, at 795 ("From the decision, we can conclude that a
possibility of future impairment can be considered an impairment protected under the
Act if perceived to be a handicap by the employer.").
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of discrimination based on risk of future injury.160 In Bentivegna
v. United States Department of Labor, the City of Los Angeles
refused to hire Bentivegna, an applicant with diabetes. 1 ' The
city required all applicants with diabetes to show blood sugar
test results that were consistently below a certain level. At his
physical examination, one of Bentivegna's tests indicated what
the city considered a lack of control of his diabetes. The city
then terminated Bentivegna from his position as a building
repairer. 162
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether Ben-
tivegna was qualified for the position in question.16 3 The city's
argument was that uncontrolled diabetes would cause an em-
ployee to contract serious infections from minor injuries and
heal more slowly, and be more likely to have long term health
problems.164 The court dismissed the city's distinction between
controlled and uncontrolled diabetes, stating that the distinction
was not sufficiently supported to justify firing an employee with
diabetes.165 The court then stated that "allowing remote con-
cerns [about long-term health problems] to legitimize discrimi-
nation against the handicapped would vitiate the effectiveness of
section 504 of the Act. . . Such considerations cannot provide
the basis for discriminatory job qualifications unless they can be
connected directly to 'business necessity or safe performance of
the job.' ",166
The Ninth Circuit followed this decision in Mantolete v.
Bolger.167 The United States Postal Service denied Mantolete a
position as a machine distribution clerk because she suffered
from epilepsy. 68 The postal service argued that working with a
letter sorter machine could be dangerous to Mantolete if she
were to suffer a seizure while working. They did not look at her
employment history; she had worked with machinery as danger-
16' See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982);
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
'61 694 F.2d at 620.
162 Id.
Id. at 621.
164 Id.
:60 Id. at 622.
o Id. at 623.
767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985).
'" Id. at 1418.
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ous as the letter sorter in the past."6 9
The court held that in order to screen out qualified individ-
uals with disabilities, an employer must show a reasonable
probability of substantial harm.17 0 The court stated the test as
follows: "[I]s the applicant presently qualified to perform the es-
sential requirements of the job without a reasonable probability
of substantial injury to the applicant or others? If the answer to
this question is affirmative, then employment cannot be denied
based upon the handicap."'' Although the majority included
risk to the applicant among the employer's considerations, the
concurring opinion noted that this consideration is contrary to
Title VII cases, where risk to the applicant is insufficient reason
to deny employment.17 2
Using these standards, a hypersusceptible individual would
still be considered a qualified employee under the ADA. Genetic
tests are not sufficiently adequate to- show a reasonable
probability of any harm resulting from hypersusceptibility, nor
are the potential consequences necessarily a substantial harm.
While each case of discrimination against a hypersusceptible in-
dividual would need to be judged on a case-by-case basis, the
burden would be on the employer to prove that the test used
was sufficiently reliable to meet the "reasonable probability of
substantial harm" standard. Nonetheless, an individual who was
denied a job because of hypersusceptibility would have a viable
cause of action under the ADA.
c. Exclusion Because of Business Necessity or Safety
Concerns
An employer may attempt to justify screening out appli-
cants posing a special risk of future harm by asserting that such
procedures are job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity.17 3 While the Mantolete standard examines the reasonable
probability of substantial harm to the applicant or others, Title
VII case law examining the bona fide occupational qualification
169 Id. at 1419.
'o Id. at 1422.
'71 Id. at 1423.
17 Id. at 1425 n.1 (Rafeedie, J., concurring) (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 Us.
321 (1972)). See text accompanying notes 174-78 infra.
13 ADA §§ 102(c)(4)(A) & 103(a).
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(bfoq) defense, 174 a defense similar to the business necessity de-
fense of the ADA, does not consider either risk of harm to the
plaintiff or the defendant's economic concerns sufficient to over-
ride Title VII's prohibition of discrimination. 175
Courts have consistently interpreted the bfoq defense nar-
rowly. The Fifth Circuit interpreted the defense as requiring the
employer to prove that "the essence of the business operation
would be undermined" if the employer were prohibited from dis-
criminating. 76 Earlier, the same court had stated that an em-
ployer needed to prove "that he had reasonable cause to believe,
that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the du-
ties of the job" in order to support a bfoq defense. 177 Where fu-
ture harm is at issue, the question is not whether there is a
threat of harm to the applicant, but whether there is "a substan-
tial safety risk to the public at large, clients, or other employ-
ees." 178 Because the harm at issue is the hypersusceptibility or
elevated risk of future injury to the applicant, the bfoq safety
defense would fail in a Title VII case.179
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The bfoq defense applies "in those certain instances
where.., sex... is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ... ." Id.
Congress developed bfoq as a defense to disparate treatment, or facial discrimina-
tion, claims. Disparate treatment cases assert that an employer treated an applicant or
employee differently because she is a member of a protected class. Disparate impact
claims assert that an employer's practice, while not discriminatory against members of a
protected class on its face, has the intended or unintended result of adversely affecting
members of a protected class. Employers charged with discrimination based on a dispa-
rate impact theory may employ a different defense, as set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs business necessity defense states that in order to be
legitimate, "any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment
in question." 401 U.S. at 432.
Because discrimination based on hypersusceptibility is of the disparate treatment/
facially discriminatory variety, the ADA business necessity test would be best inter-
preted in a manner consistent with, if not more stringent than, Title VII's statutory
defense to disparate treatment claims-the bfoq defense.
175 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1972) ("In the usual case, the argu-
ment that a particular job is too dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the
rejoinder that it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that
choice for herself.").
"' Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.) (gender not
bfoq for flight attendant), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
W" eeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
' Peirce, supra note 116, at 783.
179 Id.
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Looking to the legislative history of the ADA, it appears
that Congress would support the less paternalistic Title VII ap-
proach over the Mantolete standard. As the House report
stated:
[E]mployment decisions must not be based on paternalistic views
about what is best for a person with a disability. Paternalism is per-
haps the most pervasive form of discrimination for people with disa-
bilities and has been a major barrier to such individuals. A physical or
mental employment criterion can be used to disqualify a person with
a disability only if [it] has a direct impact on the ability of the person
to do their actual job duties without imminent, substantial threat of
harm. Generalized fear about risks from the employment environ-
ment, such as exacerbation of the disability caused by stress, cannot
be used by an employer to disqualify a person with a disability."'
The House describes the limited situation in which one can be
deemed "not qualified" as one where the examining physician
found that there was a "high probability of substantial harm if
the candidate performed the particular functions of the job in
question... [and] the employer could [not] make a reasonable
accommodation to the candidate's condition that would avert
such harm [without causing] an undue hardship."' 8' The assess-
ment must be based on valid medical analyses-the tests must
actually and reliably predict the substantial, imminent degree of
harm required.182 In addition, the determination may be chal-
lenged by the applicant's physician. "An employer is not
shielded from liability merely by a statement from the em-
ployer's physician that a threat of imminent, substantial harm
exists by hiring an applicant with a particular disability."'8s3 Fi-
nally, as the House report stated, the hazards to be avoided are
hazards to other individuals in the workplace, not to the individ-
0so EDUCATION AND LABOR REPoRT, supra, note 58, at 74. See SENATE REPOr, supra
note 23, at 40.
Paternalistic policies designed to protect the members of a specific group, even when
well-intentioned, have been recognized as a means of rationalizing and even encouraging
discrimination against the members of that group. As Justice Brennan stated in Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973): "Traditionally, [discrimination against
women] was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical ef-
fect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." The same could be said today for
paternalistic policies designed to "protect" individuals with disabilities.
181 EDUCATION AND LABOR RoiRT, supra, note 58, at 73. This standard is very simi-
lar to the standard set in Mantolete.
182 Id.
"' Id. at 73-74.
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
ual with the disability.
In addition, the Supreme Court recently held that even po-
tential injury to an as-yet unconceived fetus is not sufficient rea-
son for an employer to refuse to hire fertile women. 185 In John-
son Controls the Supreme Court decided that this potential
future harm was not sufficient to invoke Title VII's bfoq de-
fense, stating "[n]o one can disregard the possibility of injury to
future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it
transforms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of
batterymaking."1 86 Since the Supreme Court is unwilling to al-
low discrimination to protect third parties from potential injury,
it seems likely that they would prohibit discrimination based on
the threat of injury to the plaintiff herself.
Similarly, it is not clear whether economic concerns-tort
liability, reducing workers' compensation claims, or decreasing
insurance costs-are business necessities under the ADA.187
Given the goals Congress set forth in the ADA-"to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,
and economic self-sufficiency" for individuals with disabili-
ties-and the fact that employers are required to pay for physi-
cal accommodations, including auxiliary aids and services, for
employees with disabilities, it would not be inconsistent to find
that economic concerns not posing an "undue hardship" are in-
sufficient to warrant excluding individuals with disabilities from
certain positions.
Drawing on Title VII case law, the Supreme Court majority
in Johnson Controls criticized the concurrences' attempt to ex-
tend the bfoq defense to cost and safety concerns; 188 Justice
White's concurring opinion had argued that the risk of tort lia-
bility was a sufficient business concern to support a bfoq de-
fense. 8 9 The Johnson Controls majority affirmed the belief that
employers should have only a narrow bfoq defense to discrimi-
nation claims, one that is not justifiable by cost alone.1 0 Accord-
184 Id. at 74.
181 International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
188 Id. at 1206.
Peirce, supra note 116, at 787.
188 1 S. Ct. at 1208-09.
188 Id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190 Id. at 1209-10.
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ingly, the possible cost of potential future harm should not be a
viable defense under the ADA either.
CONCLUSION
The ADA is important not only because of the new prohibi-
tions against discrimination it provides, but also because it clari-
fies an area of the law left unclear under Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act. The question of job reassignment has been an
area of intense dispute since 1973, causing grave anxiety for un-
told numbers of individuals with disabilities. In addition, as ge-
netic technology improves, millions of individuals who are cur-
rently healthy but who carry a genetic trait that may put them
at a higher risk for illness are being identified and excluded from
industrial jobs. While not currently disabled, these individuals
are being treated as if they were unqualified for jobs because of
their potential disabilities. Because of the experience and fore-
sight of the drafters of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, such discrimination and injustice need never happen
again.
Renge L. Cyr
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